We describe a two-message protocol that enables a purely classical verifier to delegate any quantum computation to an untrusted quantum prover. The protocol begins with the verifier publishing a problem instance together with a public cryptographic key. The prover then transmits the computation result, appropriately encoded. Finally, the verifier uses their private key to detect any cheating and extract the result. We achieve this by upgrading the verification protocol of Mahadev in two steps. First, the protocol is repeated many times in parallel, yielding a four-message protocol with negligible soundness error. This enables the second step: the "challenge round" is eliminated via the Fiat-Shamir transform, in which the prover computes their own challenges using a public hash function.
Introduction

Background
Quantum verification. Quantum computing devices can apparently solve problems that are infeasible for classical computers. As significant progress is made toward constructing quantum computers, a major challenge is the verification of such devices, particularly as they reach scales that rule out direct classical simulation.
One approach is to test for violations of Bell's inequality [Bel64, CHSH69] . The self-testing technique introduced by Mayers and Yao [MY04] has been extended into various verification schemes [RUV13, McK16, GKW15, HPDF15, FH15, NV17, CGJV19] . In these schemes, multiple entangled quantum provers can be verified by an efficient classical verifier, with informationtheoretic security. However, verification schemes based on quantum nonlocality require enforcing spacelike separations between the provers, making it unlikely that they have implications for verification of a single quantum device. That challenge has been studied in various relaxed settings, and several results have shown that a classical verifier with limited quantum resources (e.g., performing a fixed set of quantum operations on a small number of qubits) may verify any language in BQP [ABOE08, BFK09, Bro18, MF16, ABOEM17].
In a major breakthrough, Mahadev recently described the first secure protocol enabling a purely classical verifier to certify the quantum computations of a single untrusted quantum prover [Mah18] . The Mahadev protocol uses a quantum-secure cryptographic assumption to give the classical verifier leverage over the quantum prover. Specifically, the protocol is sound under the assumption that the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem does not admit a polynomialtime quantum algorithm. This assumption is widely accepted, and underlies some of the most promising candidates for the eventual replacement of RSA and ECC as the standard for publickey cryptography [AASA + 19].
The Mahadev protocol. From a theoretical perspective, Mahadev's result settled a major open question concerning the power of quantum-prover interactive arguments (QPIAs). In a QPIA, two computationally-bounded parties interact: a quantum prover and a classical verifier. The verifier's goal is to use the added power of the prover to solve a decision problem. The completeness error of a QPIA is the probability of the verifier failing to accept a YES instance even though the prover is honest. The soundness error is the probability that the verifier accepts a NO instance when interacting with a dishonest prover. In these terms, Mahadev's result showed that there is a four-round 1 QPIA for BQP with negligible completeness error and constant soundness error δ < 1. Of course, one can repeat the protocol in series to suppress the soundness error, at the cost of many additional rounds of interaction. A natural question is whether this can be improved significantly. Ideally, we would like to simultaneously reduce both the soundness error and the number of interaction rounds.
The Mahadev protocol has a high-level structure analogous to that of classical Σ-protocols [Dam02] . The goal of the verifier is to decide whether an input Hamiltonian H from a certain class is a YES instance or a NO instance for BQP.
1. The verifier V generates a private-public key pair (sk, pk) and sends pk to the prover P; 2. P prepares the ground state of H and then coherently evaluates a certain classical function f pk . This yields a state of the form
where the ground state is in a subregister of register X. P measures the output register Y and sends the result y to V. Note that P now holds a superposition over the preimages of y.
3. V replies with a uniformly random challenge bit c ∈ {0, 1}.
4. If c = 0 ("test round"), P measures the X register in the computational basis and sends the outcome. If c = 1 ("Hadamard round"), P measures X in the Hadamard basis and sends the outcome.
After the four message rounds above are completed, the verifier uses their knowledge of H and the secret key sk to either accept or reject the instance H.
Our approach
In this work, we show that the Mahadev protocol can be carried out in only two rounds, while simultaneously reducing the soundness error to negligible. Before describing our approach, we make a brief remark about round-optimality. In delegation of computations, it is plausible to suppose that the client needs to send a description of the desired computation (in some form) to the server. In such a setting, our protocol is clearly round-optimal. We remark that, with our protocol, a verifier can publish a single public key and then receive arbitrarily many proofs (i.e., second-round messages) from different provers.
Theoretically, one could ask for more: a protocol where the prover and the verifier both receive the instance from some third party, and then the prover simply sends a proof to the verifier. While we cannot rule such a protocol out, constructing it seems like a major challenge. In fact, it may even be impossible. In such a setting, the proof must be independent of the secret randomness of the verifier. This seems to make it difficult to apply the "cryptographic leash" technique of Mahadev's protocol. On the other hand, without cryptographic assumptions, a protocol such as this would immediately place BQP in MA, which is almost certainly false [Aar10] .
results. Thus we can apply standard parallel repetition theorems for classical protocols [Hai09, HPWP10, BHT19] to conclude that the parallel-repeated protocol has negligible soundness error. 2 By the classical security of the so-called Fiat-Shamir transformation [FS86] , the final two-message protocol also has negligible soundness [BR95, PS00] . We note that the second result holds in the so-called Random Oracle Model (ROM), an idealized but fairly standard model in classical cryptography [BR95] . We discuss these issues in more detail below.
Our approach to transforming the full Mahadev protocol for verifying BQP into a two-round protocol follows the same approach. The protocol transformations are unchanged: parallel repetition, followed by the Fiat-Shamir transformation. However, soundness now needs to hold against quantum provers, and we can no longer rely on classical results about these transformations. We now discuss these issues and expand on the above discussion.
Parallel repetition. Any protocol can be amplified with sequential repetition. If the original protocol has soundness error δ, the k-fold repeated protocol will have soundness error δ k . However, this comes at the cost of an increased number of interaction rounds. Parallel repetition is more desirable, but does not always reduce the soundness error, not even in the case of purely classical protocols. Bellare, Impagliazzo, and Naor [BIN97] showed that there exists a 4-round classical argument for which soundness error remains the same under parallel repetition. Whereas parallel repetition reduces the soundness error at an optimal rate for public-coin protocols [PV07, CL10, CP15] , the challenging case is that of private-coin protocols, i.e., protocols in which the verifier holds private randomness that cannot be revealed to the prover. A sequence of works showed that parallel repetition does in fact reduce the soundness error of any classical private-coin protocol, provided the protocol is slightly modified to include "random terminations" with low probability [Hai09, HPWP10, BHT19] . Does parallel repetition work for quantum-prover interactive arguments? The Mahadev protocol is a natural case to consider since it already exhibits the full decisional power of QPIAs, i.e., BQP. However, several complications arise when attempting to establish parallel repetition using classical techniques. First, the Mahadev protocol is clearly private-coin, precisely the category that is challenging even in the classical case. Second, classical proofs of parallel repetition typically involve constructing a prover (for the single-copy protocol) that uses many rounds of nested rejection sampling. The quantum analogue of such a procedure is quantum rewinding, which can only be applied in special circumstances [Wat09, ARU14] and seems difficult to apply to parallel repetition.
In this work, we establish a new parallel repetition theorem with alternative techniques, suited specifically for the Mahadev protocol. We show that, for NO instances, the accepting paths of the verifier for the two different challenges (c = 0 and c = 1) correspond to two nearly (computationally) orthogonal projectors. We also establish that this persists in k-fold parallel repetition, meaning that each pair of distinct challenge strings c, c ′ ∈ {0, 1} k corresponds to nearly orthogonal projectors. From there, a straightforward argument shows that the prover cannot succeed for more than a non-negligible fraction of challenge strings. Our result shows that kfold parallel repetition yields the same optimal soundness error δ k as sequential repetition. The resulting protocol is a four-round QPIA for verifying BQP, with negligible completeness and soundness errors.
Fiat-Shamir transformation. The second and final step is to eliminate the "challenge round" of the k-fold parallel protocol. Note that in the k-fold protocol, the second message of the verifier to the prover is a uniformly random c ∈ {0, 1} k . To eliminate the need for this message round, we adopt an established approach from classical cryptography: the aforementioned Fiat-Shamir transform. In this approach, the prover is asked to generate the challenge bits c ∈ {0, 1} k themselves by evaluating a public hash function H on the transcript of the protocol thus far. In our case, recalling (1), this means that the prover selects c := H(H, pk, y). Note that pk and y are now both k-tuples, since we are transforming the k-fold protocol. The resulting protocol now has only two messages: the initial message (H, pk) from the verifier, and the response (y, x) from the prover. Of course, the verifier also needs to adapt their actions at the verdict stage, using c = H(H, pk, y) when deciding whether to accept or reject.
Clearly, the soundness of the transformed protocol now depends crucially on the properties of the hash function H. A standard assumption when applying Fiat-Shamir is that H behaves like a uniformly random function. In practice, this is a reasonable assumption: standardized hash functions are typically not distinguishable from random in any nontrivial 3 way. This approach has the advantage of enabling a number of strategies for giving security proofs. Specifically, we work in an idealized model called the Random Oracle Model (ROM), which assumes that all parties in the protocol have black-box access to a uniformly random oracle function H. In the ROM, one can show that the Fiat-Shamir transformation is secure, in the sense that it preserves soundness up to a loss that is negligible provided H has a superpolynomially-large range [BR95, PS00] . It is straightforward to see that this last condition is required; it is also the reason for applying parallel repetition prior to the Fiat-Shamir transformation.
A complication in the quantum setting is that quantum computers can evaluate any public classical function in superposition via the unitary operator
This means that we must work in the Quantum Random Oracle Model (QROM) [BDF + 11], which grants all parties oracle access to U H . Proving the security of transformations like Fiat-Shamir (FS) in the QROM is the subject of recent research, and newly developed techniques have largely shown that FS in the QROM preserves soundness for so-called sigma-protocols [DFMS19, LZ19] . Extending those results so that they also apply to the Mahadev protocol is relatively straightforward.
Technical summary of results
Our results are summarized in the following two theorems. The soundness of our protocols is conditioned on the assumption that there is no polynomial-time quantum algorithm for solving the Learning with Errors (or LWE) problem [Reg05] . This assumption is needed for the soundness of the Mahadev protocol itself; we do not apply it anywhere else in our arguments. As the assumption is an asymptotic statement, all the protocols are parameterized 4 by a security 3 There are trivial but not useful ways to distinguish, such as simply observing that H has an efficient circuit. 4 To see how to parameterize LWE concretely, see, e.g., [BLP + 13].
parameter λ. The running time of all the relevant algorithms is then polynomial in λ, and the cryptographic assumption is that the success probability of any algorithm for solving LWE is bounded by a negligible function of λ. We refer to this below as the LWE hardness assumption. For simplicity, in our exposition we will assume that λ is some polynomial in the input BQP instance size n, so that efficient algorithms run in time poly(n) and errors are (ideally) negl(n) (where negl(n) denotes a superpolynomially small function of n).
We first state the parallel repetition result. 2. Under the LWE hardness assumption, the soundness error of M k is at most 2 −k + negl(n).
For k = 1, we improve Mahadev's bound on the soundness error (negligibly close to 3/4) to 1/2 + negl(n) [Mah18] . Our bound is optimal: there is a straightforward cheating prover who succeeds in a test round with probability 1 and in a Hadamard round with negligible probability (see Protocol 2). As discused above, applying the Fiat-Shamir transformation to M k results in a two-message protocol. We state this formally as follows. Radian and Sattath [RS19] recently established what they call "a parallel repetition theorem for NTCFs." NTCFs are the functions f pk in the Mahadev protocol above. However, the context of [RS19] is very different from that of our Theorem 1. They work with 1-of-2 puzzles, not BQP verification; in particular, their soundness experiment is quite different. Moreover, their parallel repetition theorem follows from a purely classical result.
Organization. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce quantum prover interactive arguments, the local Hamiltonian problem as it relates to BQP verification, and the Mahadev protocol. In Section 3, we show that parallel repetition reduces the soundness error of the Mahadev protocol at the optimal rate. In Section 4, we show that under the Fiat-Shamir transformation, a generalization of Σ-protocols (which includes the Mahadev protocol) remains secure in the QROM. Finally, we combine these results to establish a 2-message protocol for BQP in Section 5.
Preliminaries
Notation and conventions
Most algorithms we consider are efficient, i.e., run in time polynomial in the size of the input (typically denoted by n) and the security parameter (typically denoted by λ). The two main classes of algorithms are PPT (probabilistic, polynomial-time) and QPT (quantum polynomialtime.) We let negl(n) denote a superpolynomially small function of n, i.e., a function in 2 −ω(log n) .
Recall that, given a classical circuit for a function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m , one can easily construct a reversible (and hence also quantum) circuit for the operation
with at most constant overhead. We let U f denote the unitary operator implemented by this quantum circuit.
Quantum-prover interactive arguments
A quantum-prover interactive argument (QPIA) is an interactive protocol between two polynomiallybounded parties, a quantum prover and a classical verifier, interacting over a classical channel. A QPIA is described by a pair of algorithms: the PPT algorithm of the honest verifier V, and the QPT algorithm of the honest prover P.
Given an arbitrary prover P ′ and verifier V ′ , we let b ← [P ′ ≀ V ′ ](x) denote the process in which P ′ and V ′ interact for a given input x and produce an output b ∈ {accept, reject}.
Definition 3. Fix a language L ⊆ {0, 1} * and a QPIA (P, V ).
• We say that
• We say that (P, V ) is a QPIA for L with soundness error s if, for all x / ∈ L and for all QPT
Two standard approaches to amplifying the soundness of a QPIA (P, V ) are as follows.
• (Serial repetition) We run b j ← [P ≀ V ], k times in series, with the verifier finally outputting accept if and only if b j = accept for all j.
• (Parallel repetition) We run b j ← [P ≀ V ], k times in parallel, with the verifier finally outputting accept if and only if b j = accept for all j. By "parallel" we mean that we first initialize k copies of V, then send the first messages of each copy to the prover, then send back k responses, and so on.
It is straightforward to check that serial repetition suppresses soundness error exponentially in k. A similar result for parallel repetition is false in general [BIN97, PW07] , and is typically much more challenging to prove in cases where it holds.
The local Hamiltonian problem and verification for BQP
Any promise problem L = (L yes , L no ) ∈ QMA can be reduced to the local Hamiltonian problem such that for x ∈ L yes , the Hamiltonian H x has a low-energy ground state |ψ x , and for x ∈ L no , all quantum states have large energy [KSV02] . While the quantum witness |ψ x may be hard to prepare for general L ∈ QMA, it can be prepared efficiently if L ∈ BQP. Furthermore, the problem remains QMA-complete even with a Hamiltonian that can be measured by performing standard (Z) and Hadamard (X) basis measurements [BL08] .
Problem 1 (The 2-local ZX-Hamiltonian problem [BL08, MF16] 
where each of h i , 
Note that any Hamiltonian H = ∑ S d S S that is a linear combination of 2-local Pauli operators can be replaced by H
We consider the rescaled Hamiltonian since we can then estimate the energy by sampling a local Pauli operator S with probability |d S |/d and performing X or Z measurements, as in Protocol 1 below.
When working with Hamiltonian terms S, we overload the notation for convenience. First, we write S j to denote the Pauli operator assigned by S to qubit j, so that S = j S j . Second, we write i ∈ S to indicate that i is a qubit index for which S does not act as the identity, i.e., S i = ½.
As mentioned above, the 2-local ZX Hamiltonian problem is QMA-complete [BL08] , and thus BQP-hard. Morimae and Fitzsimons present a protocol (the "MF protocol") with a quantum prover and a limited verifier, who only needs the ability to perform single-qubit X and Z basis measurements [MF16] . In the MF protocol, under proper rescaling, we construct a Hamiltonian
where the sum is over Pauli operators S, m S ∈ {+1, −1}, and p is a distribution over Pauli operators. The prover P prepares a quantum state and sends each qubit round by round to V, so V is not required to have large quantum memory. Then V samples a term S with probability p S and performs the corresponding measurement on the associated qubits. Since estimating the energy of ½±S 2 can be done by performing Z or X basis measurements for Pauli operator S, V is only required to be able to perform these measurements.
The Mahadev protocol [Mah18] (introduced in Section 2.4) builds upon the MF protocol and removes the need for V to perform quantum measurements, thereby achieving purely classical verification. To understand this construction, we consider a version of the MF protocol in which P sends the entire state at once, as in Protocol 1.
Protocol 1 (Variant of the MF protocol).
Setup. P and V receive an instance of Problem 1, namely a Hamiltonian
where each S is a tensor product of X, Z, ½. 
Assuming the completeness-soundness gap satisfies b − a > poly(|x|) −1 , it may be efficiently amplified by parallel repetition. Specifically, V receives a quantum witness for t copies of H x and samples T local terms for each copy. By setting the acceptance threshold to In the following discussion, the term S is encoded by an n-bit string h(S): for each qubit i ∈ S, set h i = 0 for a Z basis measurement and h i = 1 for an X basis measurement. For other qubits, set h i = 0 for concreteness. We let
denote the success probability with ρ when h = h(S) is sampled in Protocol 1.
The Mahadev protocol for BQP verification
We now describe the Mahadev protocol in detail, starting with the required cryptographic primitives.
Cryptographic primitives. . Let λ be a security parameter and let q ≥ 2 be prime. Choose parameters ℓ = poly(λ), n = Ω(ℓ log q), and m = Ω(n log q). The NTCF family F = { f pk } pk∈K F is a family of keyed functions
which, on input a public key pk ∈ K F := Z m×n q × Z m q , a bit b, and x ∈ X := Z n q , outputs a distribution f pk (b, x) over Y := Z m q . Each function f pk ∈ F satisfies the injective pair property: there exists a perfect matching R pk ⊂ X × X such that f pk (0,
The NTCF family is equipped with four polynomial-time algorithms (Gen F , Chk F , Inv F , Samp F ), defined as follows.
2. Chk F is a deterministic algorithm for checking if (b, x) and y form a preimage-image pair of f pk . On input b, x, y, Chk F outputs 1 iff y ∈ supp ( f pk (b, x)).
3. Inv F is a deterministic algorithm for inverting the function f pk . On input secret key sk, bit b, and image y, Inv F returns the preimage x b,y such that y ∈ supp ( f pk (b, x b,y )), or outputs reject if no such preimage exists.
4. Samp F is an efficient quantum process which, on input pk and b ∈ {0, 1}, returns a quantum state negligibly close to
where |ψ p := ∑ y∈Y p(y)|y for distribution p. By the injective pair property, we have
. This implies that the states in {|ψ f pk (b,x) } can be perfectly distinguished by performing a standard basis measurement. Thus, intuitively, we may consider an ideal version of these functions, i.e., the distribution p is concentrated at a single point.
Similarly, the NTIF family G = {g pk } pk∈K G is a family of keyed functions
which, on input a public key pk ∈ K G , a bit b, and x ∈ X , outputs a distribution g pk (b, x) over Y. Instead of the injective pair property of NTCFs, NTIFs satisfy an injectivity property: for
An NTIF family is also equipped with a tuple of four polynomial-time algorithms (Gen G , Chk G , Inv G , Samp G ), and these are defined exactly as in the NTCF case (but with g in place of f , and G instead of F .) We remark that the states (7) prepared by Samp F and Samp G should be compared with the "idealized" state described in (1) in our initial sketch of the protocol.
The protocol. The Mahadev protocol [Mah18] for BQP verification allows V to request an X or Z basis measurement outcome without revealing the basis to P. The aim of the protocol is to verify that the prover's response, when appropriately decoded, is close to the measurement outcomes of some n-qubit quantum state ρ. Crucially, this guarantee will hold simultaneously for all basis choices h ∈ {0, 1} n , where 0 denotes a Z basis measurement and 1 denotes an X basis measurement. With this guarantee, the verifier can then apply the verification procedure of the MF protocol to the decoded responses of the prover, knowing that this will correctly decide whether the instance should be accepted or rejected.
In the following protocol, for each qubit, if V requests a Z basis measurement, then an NTIF key is sent; if V requests an X basis measurement, then an NTCF key is sent. Since Chk F and Chk G are identical, we denote them by Chk. Similarly, Samp F and Samp G are identical, so we denote them by Samp.
We now describe the protocol, as it takes place between an honest verifier V and an honest prover P. 
Discard all the bits of e but the ones specified in term S. Accept if the witness satisfies M −m S (defined in Protocol 1).
The following is a paraphrase of the main result of [Mah18] .
Theorem 4 (Theorems 1.1 and 8.6 in [Mah18] ). Protocol 2 is a four-message quantum-prover interactive argument for the class BQP with completeness error negl(n). Under the LWE hardness assumption, the soundness error of Protocol 2 is 3/4 + negl(n).
A parallel repetition theorem for the Mahadev protocol
In a k-fold parallel repetition of Protocol 2, the honest prover runs the honest single-fold prover independently for each copy of the protocol, while the honest verifier runs the single-fold verifier independently for each copy, accepting if and only if all k single-fold verifiers accept. The completeness error clearly remains negligible. We now analyze the soundness error and establish a parallel repetition theorem for the protocol.
In preparation, we fix the following notation related to the Verdict stage of Protocol 2. First, for each basis choice h ∈ {0, 1} n , the check Chk(pk i , w i , t i , y i ) = 1 is represented by a projection Π h,sk,t acting on registers WXY. Specifically, this is the projector whose image is spanned by all inputs (w, t, y) that are accepted by the verifier in the Verdict stage. Note that running Chk does not require the trapdoor sk, but the relation implicitly depends on it. Second, the two Hadamard round checks 1 and 2 are represented by projectors Λ h,sk,h,1 and Λ h,sk,h,2 , respectively. These two projectors commute since they are both diagonal in the standard basis. We define the overall Hadamard round projector Π h,sk,h := Λ h,sk,h,1 Λ h,sk,h,2 .
A lemma for the single-copy protocol
We begin by showing an important fact about the single-copy protocol: the verifier's accepting paths associated to the two challenges (denoted t and h for "test" and "Hadamard," respectively) correspond to nearly orthogonal 5 projectors. Moreover, in a certain sense this property holds even for input states that are adaptively manipulated by a dishonest prover after he has learned which challenge will take place. This fact is essential in our analysis of the parallel repetition of many copies in the following sections.
The setup. As discussed in [Mah18] , any prover P can be characterized as follows. First, pick a state family |Ψ pk ; this state is prepared on registers WXYE after receiving pk. Here Y is the register that will be measured in Round 2, W and X are the registers that will be measured in Round 4, and E is the private workspace of P. Then, choose two unitaries U t and U h to describe the Round 4 actions of P before any measurements, in the test round and Hadamard round, respectively. Both U t and U h act on WXYE, but can only be classically controlled on Y, as they must be implemented after P has measured Y and sent the result to the verifier. We will write P = (|Ψ pk , U t , U h ), where it is implicit that |Ψ pk is a family of states parameterized by pk.
At the end of the protocol, the registers WXY will have been measured and given to the verifier. Recall that we can view the final actions of the verifier as applying one of two measurements: a test-round measurement, or a Hadamard-round measurement. Recall also that Π h,sk,t and Π h,sk,h denote the "accept" projectors for those two measurements, respectively. We now additionally define, for a given prover P,
where H WX denotes the Hadamard transform on registers WX, i.e., the Hadamard gate applied to every qubit in those registers. These projectors have a natural interpretation: they describe the action of the two accepting projectors of the verifier on the initial state |Ψ pk of the prover, taking into account the (adaptive) attacks the prover will make in Round 4.
A key lemma. We now prove a fact about the single-copy protocol. The proof is largely a matter of making some observations about the results from [Mah18] , and then combining them in the right way.
Recall that, for any instance H of the ZX-Hamiltonian problem (Problem 1), Protocol 2 begins with the verifier V making a measurement basis choice h ∈ {0, 1} n for all the qubits. After interacting with a prover P, the verifier either rejects or produces a candidate measurement outcome, which is then tested as in the MF protocol (Protocol 1). We let D P,h denote the distribution of this candidate measurement outcome for a prover P and basis choice h, averaged over all measurements and randomness of P and V. It is useful to compare D P,h with an "ideal" distribution D ρ,h obtained by simply measuring some n-qubit quantum state ρ (a candidate ground state) according to the basis choices specified by h, with no protocol involved.
Lemma 5. Let P = (|Ψ pk , U t , U h ) be a prover in the Mahadev protocol such that, for every h ∈ {0, 1} n ,
Then there exists an efficiently preparable n-qubit quantum state ρ such that, for every h ∈ {0, 1} n ,
where α h,ρ (defined in (5) Now consider two ways of producing a final accept/reject output of the verifier. In the first case, an output is sampled from the distribution D P,h and the verifier applies the final checks in the Mahadev protocol. In this case, the final outcome is obtained by performing the measurement
h,sk,h } on the state |Ψ pk , and accepting if the first outcome is observed. In the second case, an output is sampled from the distribution D ρ,h and the verifier applies the final checks in the MF protocol. In this case, the acceptance probability is α h,ρ simply by definition. The result then follows directly.
We remark that Lemma 5 has the following interpretation in the soundness experiment. For soundness, we are dealing with a NO instance, which implies that there is no ground state which succeeds non-negligibly in the MF protocol. By the Lemma, for perfect provers the averaged projection E sk [ Ψ pk |Π U h h,sk,h |Ψ pk ] is then negligible. It follows that provers who succeed almost perfectly in the test round must almost certainly fail in the Hadamard round. We emphasize that this is the case even though the prover can adaptively change their state (by applying U t or U h ) after learning which round will take place. This formalizes the intuitive claim we made at the beginning of the section about "adaptive orthogonality" of the two acceptance projectors corresponding to the two round types.
The parallel repetition theorem
Characterization of a prover in the k-fold protocol. We now discuss the behavior of a general prover in a k-fold protocol. We redefine some notation we already used in the single-copy setting. Let V be the verifier and P an arbitrary prover in the k-fold protocol.
In Round 1, V selects k terms of the instance H and records the corresponding basis choices h = (h 1 , . . . , h k ) ∈ ({0, 1} n ) k . Then V samples key pairs (pk 1 , sk 1 ) , . . . , (pk k , sk k ), where each (pk j , sk j ) is an n-tuple of key pairs selected according to h j . Then V sends pk = (pk 1 , . . . , pk k ) to the prover P in register PK = (PK 1 , . . . , PK k ).
In Round 2, without loss of generality, the action of P prior to measurement is to apply a unitary U 0 = ∑ pk |pk pk| PK ⊗ (U 0,pk ) WXYE to the input state |pk PK |0 WXYE . Each of W, X, Y is now a k-tuple of registers, and E is the prover's workspace. To generate the "commitment" message to V, P performs standard basis measurement on Y. We write |Ψ pk WXYE = ∑ y β y |Ψ pk,y WXE |y Y . When the measurement outcome is y, the side state P holds is then |Ψ pk,y WXE . In the following analysis of the success probability of P, we consider the superposition |Ψ pk WXYE instead of a classical mixture of the states |Ψ pk,y WXE using the principle of deferred measurement.
In Round 3, after receiving the commitment y = (y 1 , . . . , y k ) from the prover, V sends challenge coins c := (c 1 , . . . , c k ) ∈ {0, 1} k . For the remainder of the protocol, we take the following point of view. We assume that P and V share access to a register Y whose state is fixed forever to be the standard basis state y. This is clearly equivalent to the real situation, as there P measured Y and committed to the outcome y by sending it to V.
In Round 4, without loss of generality, the action of P consists of a general operation (that can depend on c), followed by the honest action. The general operation is some efficiently implementable unitary U c on WXYE. The honest action is measurement in the appropriate basis, i. In the Verdict stage, the verifier first applies for each coordinate i the two-outcome measurement corresponding to the Π h i ,sk i ,c i from the single-copy protocol. The overall decision is then to accept if the measurements in every coordinate accept. We let
denote the corresponding acceptance projector for the entire k-copy protocol. The effective measurement on |Ψ pk WXYE is then described by the projection
The success probability of P, which is characterized by the state |Ψ pk and family of unitaries {U c } c∈{0,1} n , is thus
The proof. Recall that Lemma 5 states that the projectors corresponding to the two challenges in the single-copy Protocol 2 are nearly orthogonal, even when one takes into account the prover's adaptively applied unitaries. We show that this property persists in the k-copy protocol. Specifically, we show that all 2 k challenges are nearly orthogonal (in the same sense as in Lemma 5) with respect to any state |Ψ pk and any post-commitment unitaries U c of the prover. This can be explained informally as follows. For any two distinct challenges c = c ′ , there exists a coordinate i such that c i = c ′ i , meaning that one enters a test round in that coordinate while the other enters a Hadamard round. In coordinate i, by the single-copy result (Lemma 5), the prover who succeeds with one challenge should fail with the other. A complication is that, since we are dealing with an interactive argument, we must show that a violation of this claim leads to an efficient single-copy prover that violates the single-copy result. Once we have shown this, we can then apply it to any distinct challenge pairs c = c ′ . It then follows that we may (approximately) decompose |Ψ pk into components accepted in each challenge, each of which occurs with probability 2 −k . We can then use this decomposition to express the overall success probability of P in terms of this decomposition. As |Ψ pk is of course a normalized state, it will follow that the overall soundness error is negligibly close to 2 −k .
The "adaptive orthogonality" discussed above is formalized in the following lemma. Recall that any prover in the k-fold parallel repetition of the Mahadev protocol can be characterized by a state family {|Ψ pk } pk that is prepared in Round 2 and a family of unitaries {U c } c∈{0,1} k that are applied in Round 4.
Lemma 6 (Adaptive orthogonality lemma). Let P be a prover in the k-fold parallel repetition of the Mahadev protocol that prepares |Ψ pk in Round 2 and performs U c in Round 4. Let a, b ∈ {0, 1} k such that a = b and choose i such that a i = b i . Then there exists an n-qubit quantum state ρ such that for every basis choice h,
where α h i ,ρ (defined in (5)) is the success probability with ρ in the MF protocol conditioned on the event that h i is sampled.
Proof. Since we are proving an upper bound for a quantity that is symmetric under the interchange of b and a, we can assume that b i = 0 and a i = 1 without loss of generality. We first claim that there exists a quantum state ρ such that
for all basis choices h. For a contradiction, suppose that is not the case. Then there exists a basis choice h * and a polynomial r such that for every state ρ,
We show that this implies the existence of an efficient prover P * for the single-copy Mahadev protocol who violates Lemma 5. Define the following projector on WXYE:
Here Π denotes the single-copy protocol acceptance projector for the Hadamard round, with key sk i and basis choice h * i . In the above, Π acts on the ith set of registers, i.e., W i X i Y i . The projector Σ a corresponds to performing the appropriate Hadamard test in the ith protocol copy, and simply accepting all other copies unconditionally. It follows that Π U a h * ,sk,a Σ a , and we thus have
The single-copy prover P * interacts with the single-copy verifier V * as follows.
• In Round 1, after receiving the public key pk * of V * , initialize k − 1 internally simulated verifiers, and set pk to be the list of their keys, with pk * inserted in the ith position. Let h = (h 1 , . . . , h k ) be the basis choices, and note that all but h i are known to P * .
• Using the algorithms of P, perform the following repeat-until-success (RUS) procedure for at most q = r 4 steps.
1. Prepare the state |Ψ pk on registers WXYE, and then apply the unitary U b .
2. Apply the measurement determined by Π h,sk,b (defined in (13)); for index i we can use pk * because b i = 0; for the rest we know the secret keys. 3. If the measurement rejects, go to step (1.), and otherwise apply U † b and output the state.
If the RUS procedure does not terminate within q steps, then P * prepares a state 6 |Φ * pk by performing Samp coherently on |0 n W (see Round 2 of Protocol 2). Note that if P * terminates within q steps, the resulting state is
otherwise |Φ * pk is prepared.
• For the Round 2 message, measure the Y i register of |Φ pk and send the result to V * .
• When V * returns the challenge bit w in Round 3, if w = b i = 0, apply U b (resp. ½) to |Φ pk (resp. |Φ * pk ), and otherwise apply U a . Then behave honestly, i.e., measure W i X i in computational or Hadamard bases as determined by w, and send the outcomes.
By the RUS construction and the fact that b i = 0, the state |Φ pk or |Φ * pk is in the image of the test-round acceptance projector in the ith coordinate. This means that, when V * enters a test round, i.e., w = 0 = b i , P * is accepted perfectly. In other words, P * is a perfect prover 7 and thus satisfies the hypotheses of Lemma 5. Now consider the case when V * enters a Hadamard round, i.e., w = 1. Let
6 To pass the test round, any efficiently preparable state suffices. 7 While we used Π h * ,sk,b in the RUS procedure, and h * i is (almost always) not equal to the h i selected by V * , the result is still a perfect prover state. This is because, as described in Protocol 2, the acceptance test in the test round is independent of the basis choice. denote the set of "good" secret keys. For a good secret key, the probability of not terminating within q = poly(n) steps is at most (1
. Therefore, the success probability of RUS for the good keys is 1 − negl(n). Thus we have
where we let
denote the expectation value of f (X) conditioned on event E for random variable X over finite set X with distribution p and function f : X → [0, 1]. Now we divide (20) into two terms and find
Since q = r 4 , this is a contradiction. Therefore (17) holds, i.e.,
It then follows that
as claimed.
We emphasize that, in Lemma 6, for each pair a = b the quantity is upper-bounded by the acceptance probability of measuring some state ρ in the basis h i , and the quantum state ρ may be different among distinct choices of (a, b) and i. This implies that that by standard amplification (see Section 2.3), averaging over the distribution of the basis choice h, if P succeeds with one particular challenge perfectly, it must fail all the others except with negligible probability. We note that with this strategy, P succeeds with probability no more than 2 −k + negl(n). We also remark that the adaptive orthogonality is guaranteed under a computational assumption. Assuming that no efficient quantum adversary can break the underlying security properties based on plain LWE, the projections are pairwise orthogonal in the sense of averaging over the key pairs (pk, sk) (efficiently sampled from a distribution depending on the instance) and with respect to any quantum state |Ψ pk prepared with an efficient quantum circuit.
While the above observation rules out the possibility of P succeeding perfectly at multiple challenges, it does not rule out the possibility that P can succeeds with appreciable probability for several challenges such that the total success probability is higher than in the above strategy. It might seem possible to achieve such a strategy by coherently simulating several distinct provers who perfectly win different challenges.
We rule out this possibility with one of our key observations: if with respect to a quantum state, the projectors are pairwise nearly orthogonal, then with respect to the same state, the above strategy is optimal. Since pairwise orthogonality holds with respect to any efficiently preparable quantum state by Lemma 6, our parallel repetition theorem follows.
First, we state a key technical lemma: 
Proof. See Appendix A.
Observe that when the projectors are mutually orthogonal, we have A 1 + · · · + A m ½ and the bound clearly holds. Lemma 7 describes a relaxed version of this fact. In our application, the projectors and the state are parameterized by the key pair, and we use this bound to show that the average of pairwise overlaps is small.
We are now ready to establish our parallel repetition theorem. 
Proof. The success probability of any prover in the k-fold protocol is
where h = h(S) is obtained by sampling a random term S with distribution π (see Section 2.3). Define a total ordering on {0, 1} k such that a < b if a i < b i for the smallest index i such that a i = b i . Then by Lemma 7, we have
By Lemma 6, there exists a negligible function δ such that 
where the second and the third inequality hold by Jensen's inequality. Since we may amplify the soundness of the MF protocol (as discussed at the end of Section 2.3), s can be made negligible.
Thus the soundness error is negligibly close to 2 −k .
We note that Mahadev shows the soundness error for a single-copy protocol is negligibly close to 3/4 [Mah18] , whereas Lemma 8 implies the error can be upper bounded by 1/2 + negl(n). 
Round reduction by Fiat-Shamir transformation
In this section we show that the Fiat-Shamir transformation can be used to reduce the number of rounds in the k-fold parallel Mahadev protocol from four to two, while keeping both the completeness and the soundness errors negligible.
Fiat-Shamir for Σ-protocols in the QROM
The Fiat-Shamir (FS) transformation turns any public-coin 3-message interactive argument, also called a Σ-protocol, into a single-message protocol in the random oracle model (ROM). A Σ-protocol consists of the following type of interaction between V and P: In the Fiat-Shamir transformation, the prover generates their own challenge by making a query to a uniformly random oracle function H, and then computing their response m as usual. The transformed protocol thus does not require V to send any messages.
Protocol 4 (FS-transformed protocol for L). Both V FS and P FS receive the instance x ∈ L and are given access to a random oracle H. 
Verdict. V FS outputs V(x, y, H(x, y), m).
In the standard approach, one proves that the Fiat-Shamir transformation preserves soundness in the so-called Random Oracle Model. In this idealized cryptographic model, all parties receive oracle access to a uniformly random function H. Against quantum adversaries, there is a well-known complication: a quantum computer can easily evaluate any actual instantiation of H (with a concrete public classical function) in superposition via U H : |x, y |z → |x, y |z ⊕ H(x, y) .
We thus work in the Quantum Random Oracle Model (QROM), in which all parties receive quantum oracle access to U H .
The reduction for Σ-protocols in the QROM. While this is nontrivial to prove, the Fiat-Shamir transformation remains secure in the QROM, up to some mild conditions on the Σ-protocol [DFMS19] . The proof proceeds by a reduction that uses a successfully cheating prover A H in the FS-transformed protocol to build a successfully cheating prover S in the Σ-protocol. This can actually be done in a black-box way, so that S only needs to query A.
We let Y, C, M, E denote the registers storing the commitment, challenge, response, and prover workspace, respectively. A q-query prover A H is characterized by a sequence of unitaries A 0 , A 1 , . . . , A q on registers Y, C, M, E. After i queries, it is in the state
In a normal execution, A H first prepares |ψ H q , then measures Y and M in the standard basis and sends the outcome to V FS (see Protocol 4). The success probability is
The prover S A begins by internally instantiating a quantum-secure pseudorandom function 8 F [Zha12] . It then chooses a random index i ∈ {0, . . . , q} and prepares the state |ψ F i . Note that the queries of A are answered using F . Next, the simulator performs a standard basis measurement on register Y and sends the outcome y to V. After V returns a random challenge Θ, S A constructs a reprogrammed oracle, denoted by F * Θy, with
which will be used for the remaining simulation of A. S A then tosses a random coin b and performs the following: 
where S A , Θ denotes the interaction between V, who sends a challenge Θ, and S A in the Σ-protocol. The following theorem establishes that the success probabilities of S A and A H are polynomially related.
Theorem 10 (Quantum security of Fiat-Shamir [DFMS19, Theorem 2]).
Extension to generalized Σ-protocols
In this section, we show that Fiat-Shamir also preserves soundness for a more general family of protocols, which we call "generalized Σ-protocols." In such a protocol, the verifier can begin the protocol by sending an initial message to the prover. The Mahadev verification protocol for BQP is an example of such a protocol, where this initial message is an LWE public key.
Generalized Σ-protocols. A generalized Σ-protocol starts with the V sending an initial message which is computed from V's private randomness. The interaction that follows is similar to a Σ-protocol. Proof. Suppose that there is a prover who succeeds in the transformed protocol with success probability ǫ. Then by Lemma 11, we may construct a prover who succeeds with probability By Theorem 12, if both s and |Y | are 2 ω(log λ) for security parameter λ, the soundness error of the transformed protocols remains negligible in λ against an efficient prover who makes q = poly(λ) queries.
Two-round verification of quantum computation
Now we put the above results together to establish a 2-message verification protocol for BQP, described in Protocol 7, with negligible completeness and soundness error, in the QROM.
Protocol 7 (A 2-message verification protocol for quantum computation).
Setup. Both P and V receive an instance of Problem 1, namely H = ∑ S p S ½+m S S 2 and set n = |H|. Choose a security parameter λ = poly(n) and set k = ω(log λ). Both P and V are given access to a hash function H. 
. , S k and computes h j = h(S j ).
For each copy j ∈ [k] and each qubit i, if h ji = 0, V samples (sk ji , pk ji ) ← Gen G (1 λ ); otherwise V samples (sk ji , pk ji ) ← Gen F (1 λ ). V sends pk = (pk ji ) i∈ [n] ,j∈ [k] to P.
Round 2. P sends V strings (y, w, t) where y = (y ji ) i∈ [n] ,j∈ [k] , w = (w ji ) i∈ [n] ,j∈ [k] and t = (t ji ) i∈ [n] ,j∈ [k] . The following is then a direct consequence of Theorem 9 and Theorem 12.
Theorem 13. Protocol 7 is a two-round, quantum-prover, classical-verifier protocol for the class BQP, with negligible completeness and soundness errors.
Discussion
We have shown that any language in BQP can be verified with a 2-message protocol while maintaining negligible soundness and completeness error. We achieve this by applying the Fiat-Shamir transformation to a parallel-repeated version of the Mahadev protocol.
This work raises several interesting open questions. First, is it possible to prove the soundness of our protocol when the oracle H is instantiated with a concrete hash function? Our current analysis applies only in an idealized model, i.e., in the QROM.
It is also natural to study parallel repetition for more general QPIAs. While it is known that parallel repetition does not reduce the soundness error for any protocol, can we prove a parallel repetition theorem for any QPIA after some modification (such as to include random terminations)? Natural examples include the protocols of [GV19, VZ19, BCM + 18].
Finally, is it possible to make BQP verification completely non-interactive? Since the Mahadev protocol makes crucial use of a public-key primitive, such a result would presumably have to use a different approach and/or different cryptographic tools. 
A Proof of Lemma
The inequality (41) holds since |ψ ψ| ½, and thus 
